Abstract. This paper investigates social optima of mean field linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) control models with Markov jump parameters. The common objective of the agents is to minimize a social cost-the cost average of the whole society. In the cost functions there are coupled mean field terms. First, we consider the centralized case and get a parameterized equation of mean field effect. Then, we design a set of distributed strategies by solving a limiting optimal control problem in an augmented state space subject to the consistency requirement for mean field approximation. It is shown that the set of distributed strategies is asymptotically team-optimal, and the asymptotically optimal social cost value can be obtained explicitly. The optimal social average cost is compared with the optimal individual cost in mean field games by virtue of the explicit expressions, and the difference is further illustrated by a numerical example.
1. Introduction. In recent years, mean field games and control have drawn a lot of attention from the control community [11] . Mean field models have broad backgrounds in many areas including economics, finance, communication engineering, biology, and medicine [12, 9, 7, 3] . Such models have been investigated by researchers from a variety of perspectives [16, 21, 42, 44, 37] . In mean field models, each agent is affected by the average interaction of all the other agents, while the individual influence of each agent is negligible. From the relationship between population macroscopic behavior and individual behavior, one can get that the population aggregate (mean field) effect satisfies a fixed-point equation. Then by tackling the fixed-point equation and the single-agent optimal control problem, decentralized asymptotic Nash equilibria are obtained [17, 22, 37] . For more literature, readers are referred to [22] for mean field games with stochastic time-averaged costs, [15, 28, 38] for mean field models with a major player, [40] for mean field Stackelberg games, [14] for mean field games with model uncertainty, [36] for application to dynamic production output adjustment with sticky prices, and [43, 41, 4, 6] for various control examples of multiagent systems.
In practical financial markets, ecological systems, and social systems, the ambient environment is constantly changing. For instance, the change rates of prices in a financial market may be very different for different time slots. A powerful tool depicting abrupt environmental changes is the Markov jump model [25, 8] . Wang and Zhang [37, 38, 39] investigated mean field games for multiagent systems with Markov jump parameters and gave distributed asymptotical Nash equilibrium strategies.
This paper investigates social optima in mean field linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) control with Markov jump parameters, where the common objective is to minimize the cost average of all the agents. If we take all the agents as a society, then the cost average is a social cost. This problem is usually regarded as a type of team decision problem which has a long research history [26, 30, 13, 33, 34] but most of the works focus on static decisions. In team decision problems, all the agents cooperate to achieve a common objective, while different agents have different measurements or information structures [13] . A team-optimal strategy is necessarily person-by-person optimal; under some convexity conditions, the person-by-person optimal strategy is also team-optimal [1] . Tembine et al. [32] considered the asymptotic behavior for mean field Markov team decision problems and focused on seeking the stationary policy which belongs to a static optimization problem. Huang, Caines, and Malhame [18] investigated social optima in mean field LQG control problems and gave centralized and decentralized team-optimal solutions. Compared with [32, 18] , we will study a kind of dynamic team decision problems with Markov jump parameters, which are closely related to practical backgrounds [25, 8] .
Different from previous works [16, 17, 18, 37, 38, 39] , dynamics and costs of all the agents in this paper are driven by a common continuous-time Markov chain, which is a form of common noise [5] . In the previous works, the parameters of agents are constants (random variables) or a sequence of independent Markov chains and the mean field effect is a deterministic function which can be calculated by tackling a fixed-point equation. In contrast, the mean field effect in our model is a stochastic process depending on the Markov jump parameter due to the impact of the common random parameter. Thus, the above approach cannot be entirely applied to handle the problem in this paper. Also, the socially optimal problem involving optimization of the average of individual costs has very high computational complexity. We achieve the control synthesis by the parametric approach and the state space augmentation. By analyzing the centralized strategy, we get a parameterized equation of mean field effect and a transformation of the original social optimum problem. From these we construct an optimal control problem with the indefinite state weight in the augmented state space. By solving this problem with the consistency requirement for mean field approximation, we obtain a set of consistency equations, from which a set of distributed strategies is designed. By constructing stochastic Lyapunov functions, we show that the closed-loop system is uniformly stable, and the set of distributed strategies is asymptotically team-optimal. Furthermore, we provide an explicit expression of the asymptotically optimal social cost by ergodic limiting theory of Markov chains. Meanwhile, we get an explicit expression of the optimal individual cost in mean field games with the help of the results in our previous works [35, 37] . By comparing these two expressions, one can obtain the difference of the optimal average costs within team and game formulations, which shows the efficiency of cooperation. This is further illustrated by a numerical example.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 formulates the socially optimal team problem of mean field LQG models with Markov jump parameters. Section 3 provides the form of mean field effect and a transformation of the social optimum problem. Section 4 presents a set of distributed strategies by solving a limiting optimal control problem subject to the consistency requirement for mean field approximation. Section 5 shows the asymptotic optimality of distributed strategies. Section 6 gives the asymptotically optimal social cost and the optimal individual cost in mean field games. Section 7 provides a numerical example to verify the result. Section 8 concludes the paper.
The following notation will be used in the paper. · denotes the Euclidean vector norm or matrix norm induced by the Euclidean vector norm; I n denotes an n-dimensional identity matrix. For a given matrix A, A T denotes its transpose, and A > 0 means that A is positive definite. For any vector x with proper dimensions and symmetric matrix Q ≥ 0, x Q = (x T Qx) 1/2 . For an n-dimensional matrix P , λ min (P ) denotes the minimum eigenvalue of P , and λ max (P ) denotes maximum eigenvalue of P . I B denotes the indicator function of set B. C b ([0, ∞), R n ) denotes the class of n-dimensional bounded continuous functions in [0, ∞).
2. Problem formulation. Consider a multiagent system of the form
where x i ∈ R n and u i ∈ R r are the state and input of the ith agent, and {W i (t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N } is a family of independent d-dimensional Brownian motions. The underlying filtered probability space is (Ω, F, (F t ) t≥0 , P ), where (F t ) t≥0 is a collection of nondecreasing σ-algebras. h ∈ C b ([0, ∞), R n ) is a deterministic external disturbance, reflecting the impact of the environment. {θ(t)} is a continuous-time Markov chain taking value in S = {1, 2, . . . , m} with transition rate matrix (infinitesimal generator) Λ = {λ ij , i, j = 1, . . . , m}. The cost of the ith agent is
where Q j ≥ 0 and R j > 0, j = 1, . . . , m. Φ :
, and u = {u 1 , . . . , u i , . . . , u N }. The main goal is to seek a set of distributed strategies that optimizes the social (average) cost J (N ) (u) for the system (2.1)-(2.2), where
Specifically, each agent makes decisions to minimize the social cost J (N ) over the distributed strategy set
and lim sup
This is a type of team decision problem with the common objective J (N ) . As a contrast, we introduce the game problem: agent i makes decisions to minimize the individual cost J i over the distributed strategy set U d,i , i = 1, . . . , N .
Remark 2.1. The social optimum is a kind of team problem where all the agents cooperate to minimize the cost average of the society. On the contrary, the (noncooperative) game involves competitive agents; each agent is only concerned with its own cost.
For the convenience of reference, we list some assumptions as follows: (A1) x i (0), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , are independent random variables; {x i (0)}, {W i (t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N } and {θ(t)} are independent of each other.
is mean square stabilizable. 3. Mean field approximation and transformation of socially optimal problems. In this section, we first get asymptotic behavior of population state average x (N ) from heuristic derivation. Next, we provide a transformation of the original social optimum problem by analyzing an open-loop centralized strategy.
3.1. Heuristic derivation of mean field effect. To design the distributed strategy, the key step is to analyze the asymptotic behavior of population state average x (N ) . In the previous works on mean field models with time-invariant parameters, x (N ) in the closed-loop system converges to a deterministic function, which is called the mean field effect. In contrast, for the model (2.1)-(2.2), the mean field effect (population aggregate behavior) is stochastic due to the impact of the random parameter. Specifically, x (N ) (t) collapses into a stochastic process depending on the jump parameter θ(s), s ≤ t, as the number of agents grows to infinity.
We now get the form of the mean field effect by heuristic examination of x
under centralized strategies. If each agent can get the state information of all agents, then we can take the problem (2.1)-(2.2) as the standard Markov jump LQG optimal control problem. By solving a set of coupled dynamic programming equations, one can obtain a centralized feedback control for the each agent [25, 2] :
where 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,P (·),P (·) ∈ R n×n , ands(·) ∈ R n . In the control strategy above, we suppose that the coefficient matrix of each state only depends on θ(t). The main reason is as follows: (i) for the single-agent Markov jump optimal control problem, the control gain is only dependent on θ(t) [25] ; (ii) as θ(t) ≡ j 0 , the original problem is reduced into the standard LQG optimal control problem, and in this case the control gain is a constant matrix [2] . Since there is a time-varying term h(t) in the state equation (2.1),s is dependent not only on θ(t) but also on t explicitly. We can get s by solving a set of coupled differential equations. Substituting the above strategy into the state equation (2.1) leads to the closed-loop equation:
1 Assumption (A2) holds if and only if for any given positive definite matrices N 1 , . . . , Nm, there exists a unique set of positive definite solutions {P j , j = 1, . . . , m} to the following coupled Riccati equations:
See [25, 19] for more conditions that ensure mean square stabilizability of the system (2.3).
Summing up the above equation from i = 1 to N , and dividing by N , we get
Owing to the coupling coefficient between two agents being 1/N , we can roughly assume that the magnitude ofP θ(t) is 1/N , and (N − 1)P θ(t) converges to a matrixvalued function as N → ∞. Notice that
Thus, letting N → ∞, from (3.1) the mean field effect satisfies
where M (·) ∈ R n×n and s(·) ∈ R n are parameters to be determined. It is worth pointing out that the above form of the mean field effect is obtained only by heuristic arguments and the relevant hypotheses need to be verified further.
Transformation of socially optimal problems. Let
be the centralized strategy set. Then, a so-called team-optimal solution is referred to a set of strategies u
Notice that all the agents share a common social cost. Seeking the team-optimal centralized strategy is equivalent to solving a multivariate optimal control problem.
As we know, the team-optimal strategy is necessarily person-by-person optimal [1] . We provide a transformation of problem (2.1)-(2.2) by using an argument similar to Lemma 3.5 in [18] .
2), thenû i is necessarily an optimal strategy of the following control problem:
where
is the cost to be minimized over u i ∈ U c ,x
The above lemma shows that the terms in J (N ) affected by u i appear only in (3.3) whenû −i = (û 1 , . . . ,û i−1 ,û i+1 , . . . ,û N ) is given. By analyzing (3.3) we obtain the cost for agent i only depends on x i , u i andx
−i does not change with individual strategy u i . Thus, to get the solution of the social optimum problem within population limit by mean field approximation, we can first solve an optimal tracking problem with an unknown exogenous signal. Lemma 3.1 acts on guidance of constructing distributed control strategies.
4. Distributed strategy design. From the previous heuristic derivation, as N → ∞, x (N ) (t) may be approximated by a stochastic process z(t), which depends on θ(t) and satisfies (3.2). By Lemma 3.1, we construct the following auxiliary optimal control problem:
Taking (x i , z) as a 2n-dimensional state, the above problem can be rewritten as follows:
We introduce the coupled algebra Riccati equations
and the coupled ordinary differential equations
If the corresponding conditions in Lemma A.1 are satisfied, then the optimal control law of problem (P1) is given by
Substituting the control law (4.6) into the dynamic equation (4.2), we get
Then, from (4.7) it follows that
Summing up the above equation from i = 1 to N , and then, dividing by N , we have
From the law of large numbers, it follows that
By the mean field methodology [17, 37] , (4.8) in the infinite population limit should be consistent with (3.2) in the sense that as N → ∞, x (N ) in (4.8) can be approximated by z in (3.2). Thus, to proceed with the design of distributed strategies, we impose the following consistency condition:
Combining (4.4), (4.5), (4.9), and (4.10) leads to the system of consistency equations:
is mean-square stable.
Remark 4.1. If for any initial value y 0 we have E y(t) 2 → 0(t → ∞), then the system (4.12) is mean-square stable. By [19, 10] , the system (4.12) is mean-square stable if and only if for any positive definite matrix N j , j = 1, . . . , m, the equation
admits a unique set of positive definite solutions P j , j = 1, . . . , m.
We now examine under what conditions there exists a stabilizing solution to (4.11). Note
and
Equation (4.9) can be equivalently transformed into (4.13)
Then, we have
This together with (4.13) implies that (4.9) is equivalent to (4.14)
By partitioning the matricesĀ j and K j , (4.4) can be transformed into
Substituting (4.14) into the above equation yields the following four matrix equations: 
Since the system (4.19) is mean-square stable, then it is also mean-square stabilizable. If H 
,2 y(t)dt is mean-square stable. However, K j,2 is not necessarily positive definite or even symmetric since it is not a diagonal block. Hence, we do not have to require that H Q j , j = 1, . . . , m, are positive definite.
Let's look at the following example.
Example 4.1. Take the parameters in (2.1)-(2.2) as follows.
In this case, H For further analysis, we introduce the following assumption: (A3) There exists a set (K 1,2 (K 1,2 , . . . , K m,2 ) such that R j (K 2 ) > 0, where
. . , m. In this case, K j,2 is taken as the maximal solution such that the system (4.21) is meansquare stable. The so-called maximal solution is referred to as a solution (P 1 , . . . , P m ) to (4.21) if for any (P 1 , . . . ,P m ) with R j (P 1 , . . . ,P m ) ≥ 0, it holds that P j −P j ≥ 0. On the other hand, if H Q j ≥ 0, then (A3) holds necessarily. Note that (4.17) can be deformed equivalently to Proof. We only need to prove that the system (4.12) is stable in the mean-square sense. See Appendix B for the proof.
We now provide that there exists a unique set of r j (t), s j (t), j = 1, . . . , m, satisfying (4.5) and (4.10). Substituting (4.10) into (4.5) gives
where Proof. See Appendix B for the proof.
By Theorems 4.2 and 4.3, there exists a stabilizing solution to the system of consistency equations (4.11) . This implies that we can get a set of distributed strategies:
where (K j , r j , j = 1, . . . , m) is a stabilizing solution to (4.11), and r j,1 ∆ = (I n , 0)r j .
5. Analysis of asymptotic optimality. Applying the control strategy (4.24) into the system (4.2) gives the closed-loop system equation
We first provide the uniform stability of the closed-loop system.
Theorem 5.1. Under assumptions (A1)-(A3), there exists a constant C 0 independent of N such that the strategy (4.24) and the closed-loop system (5.1) satisfy
Proof. See Appendix C for the proof.
Below we provide a result of the approximation error, which is useful to analyze asymptotic optimality of the set of strategies (4.24). lim sup
Proof. It follows from the closed-loop dynamics (5.1) that
Notice that M θ(t) = G θ(t),1 + G θ(t),2 . Then, by (5.4) and (5.5) we have
where ξ (N ) (t) =x (N ) (t) −ẑ(t). Since {W i (t), i = 1, . . . , N } is a family of independent standard Brownian motions, then we have that for all t > s,
Hence, the process
is also a Brownian motion [20] . Let V 1 (j, x) = x T P j,1 x, j = 1, . . . , m, x ∈ R n , and A (N ) denote the infinitesimal generator of {θ(t), ξ (N ) (t)} in (5.6). Then, from (B.2) it follows that
By Dynkin's formula [29] , we have
whereλ = max 1≤j≤m (λ max (P j,1 )). This together with the comparison theorem implies
Thus, we have
which implies lim sup
Now we are in a position to state the main result on asymptotic optimality of distributed strategies. Theorem 5.3. If (A1)-(A3) hold, and I −H is nonsingular, then the set of strategies (4.24) is an asymptotically team-optimal solution to the problem (2.1)-(2.2), i.e., for any u = {u i , i = 1, . . . , N |u i ∈ U c },
6. Asymptotically optimal costs. In this section, we give closed forms of the asymptotic optimal social cost and the optimal individual cost in mean field games. The difference of the optimal costs within the team and game formulations can be obtained from the two closed-form expressions.
We now give a closed-form expression of the optimal social average cost within the population limit case.
Theorem 6.1. If (A1)-(A3) hold and I − H is nonsingular, then the asymptotic optimal social cost is given by
whereẑ is determined by (5.1). Furthermore, if θ(t) is an ergodic Markov chain with stationary distribution {π j , j = 1, . . . , m}, then the optimal cost is given by
Here p j (t) ∆ = P (θ(t) = j) and
Proof. From Lemma 5.2, Theorem 5.1, and Schwarz's inequality, it follows that (6.5) max
Let J 1 (û i ) be the optimal cost of problem (P1). By (4.1), (6.5), and direct computations, we have lim sup
whereẑ is determined by (5.1). From Schwarz's inequality, Lemma 5.2, and Theorem 5.1, it follows that lim sup
This together with (6.6) leads to lim sup
which together with Lemma A.1 and Theorem 5.3 gives (6.1).
. Then, by the generalized Itô's formula [31] we have
where p j (t) = P (θ(t) = j). Noticing thatẑ(0) = Ex i (0) = x 0 , one can getz
is ergodic and the stationary distribution is π, then it follows that lim t→∞ p j (t) = π j , j = 1, . . . , m, i.e., for any > 0, there exists T 0 such that |p j (t) − π j | < , t ≥ T 0 . Noticing that
by (6.1) we have (6.4).
Remark 6.1. If for all t ≥ 0, θ(t) ≡ θ, then system (2.1)-(2.2) degenerates to the (uniform) model in [18] . In this case, the asymptotically optimal cost in (6.1) coincides with the one given by Theorem 6.2 in [18] . Actually,ẑ in (5.1) plays the same role asx in [18] , since both of them are approximations ofx (N ) in the large population case.
The above theorem provides an explicit expression of the asymptotically optimal social cost. In previous works [35, 37] , we investigated mean field games with Markov jump parameters. To make a comparison of the optimal average costs within team and game problems, we review and unite the previous results on mean field games (see [35, 37] for details). The dynamics and the cost of each agent are also given by (2.1) and (2.2). The design of decentralized strategies is implemented as follows. First, the equation of mean field effect is presumed aṡ
where M and s are to be determined. Then, we construct an auxiliary optimal control problem:
By solving the above optimal control problem and using a similar construction as that in section 4, we get a set of consistency equations:
Combining [35, Theorem 5] and [37, Theorem 3.1], we have the following result.
Theorem 6.2. For the game problem (2.1)-(2.2), if (A1)-(A2) hold and (6.7) admits a stabilizing solution, then we have (i) the set of strategies
is an ε-Nash equilibrium, where ε = 1/ √ N ; (ii) the optimal cost is given by
Furthermore, if θ(t) is an ergodic Markov chain with stationary distribution {π j , j = 1, . . . , m}, then the optimal cost is given by
Remark 6.2. The closed-form expressions of optimal average costs in team and game problems are provided in Theorems 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. The reduction of the optimal average cost incurred from the game formulation to the team formulation can be obtained and analyzed by virtue of the closed-form expressions above. From a formal perspective, the reduction term is lim sup T →∞
the sets of consistency equations are different (but similar) within different formulations. The difference of optimal average costs in two formulations shows the efficiency of cooperation in mean field control.
7. Numerical example. In this section, we illustrate the consistency of mean field approximation and the asymptotical optimality of distributed strategies via a numerical example. Furthermore, we provide a comparison of the optimal average costs between team and game problems.
Without loss of generality, we consider the following simple case. Agent i evolves by
where x i , u i ∈ R, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and {θ(t)} is a Markov chain taking value in {1, 2} with the transition rate matrix
{w i (t)} is a sequence of independent Brownian motions. The cost of agent i is described by
Take a 1 = 0.2, a 2 = 0.8, α = 5, h = 0.25. Then the Riccati equation system (4.15) has the maximal solution k 1,1 = 1.4251, k 2,1 = 1.8859 and (4.16) has the maximal solution k 1,2 = −0.2012, k 2,2 = −0.2161. Take {x i (0)} as a sequence of independent random variables with the normal distribution N (0, 3) . {θ(0)} is a random variable with P (θ(0) = 1) = 0.5 and P (θ(0) = 2) = 0.5. It can be verified that assumptions (A1)-(A3) hold. 
T . Then, from (4.23) we have
.8698, and
Noticing that
Thus, from (4.24) we obtain the following distributed strategies: 
It can be seen that ε is very small when N is 200, which implies that the set of distributed strategies (7.1) is asymptotically optimal. By Theorems 6.1 and 6.2, we compute the optimal average costs of team and game problems within population limit for h = −1.2, −0.8, −0.4, −0.25, 0.25, 0.4, 0.8, 1.2, respectively. Comparison of both optimal costs is shown in Table 1 and Figure 3 (J 1 denotes the optimal cost of the game problem, and J (∞) denotes the optimal cost of the team problem). It can be seen that the optimal cost of the game problem J 1 is greater than that of the team problem J (∞) , especially when the interaction intensity h is large. 8. Concluding remarks. In this paper, social optima have been investigated in mean field LQG control problems with Markov jump parameters. By the parametric approach and state space augmentation, a set of distributed strategies is designed and further shown to be asymptotically team-optimal. An explicit expression of the asymptotically optimal social cost is given. The difference of the optimal costs within team and game formulations can be obtained from the explicit expressions and further illustrated by a numerical example. The result of this paper can be generalized to the case where Markov jump parameters are unknown or the impact of private and public information is included [27] . Also, the model in this paper can be applied to economic growth or pollution backgrounds.
Appendix A. Markov jump optimal control with indefinite weight. Consider
, and W (t) is a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion. The initial value E x(0) 2 < ∞. θ(t) is a continuous-time Markov chain taking value in {1, 2, . . . , m} with transition rate matrix Λ = (λ ij ). The admissible control set is
Let the cost function be given by
where for any i = 1, . . . , m, Q i is symmetric, R i > 0, and
and a set of coupled ODEs,
i K i and the initial condition r i (0) is arbitrarily given. Lemma A.1. For the optimal control problem (A.1)-(A.2), assume (i) (A.3) has a symmetric solution such that the system
Then we have
(1) there exists a unique set of solutions
3) the optimal cost is given by
Particularly, if θ(t) is an ergodic Markov chain with stationary distribution {π i , i = 1, . . . , m}, then the optimal cost J(û) is given by
Proof. We can show part (1) by using the similar argument in [37, Theorem 3.1(iii)]. For part (2) we prove it by using a completion of squares technique. Noticing that Q i is merely symmetric, the integrand in (A.2) cannot be written in the square form x − g 1 2 Q θ + h 1 as in [37] . However, by a similar derivation as in [37, Theorem 3 .1] we can get that for u ∈ U,
The last equality holds if and only if u(t) =û(t)
Noticing that under the controlû, the system
is mean-square stable, we have E x(T ) = o( √ T ). Thus, we getû ∈ U, and the optimal cost is given by (A.5). If θ(t) is ergodic and the stationary distribution is {π i , i = 1, . . . , m}, then it follows that lim t→∞ P (θ(t) = i) = π i , i = 1, . . . , m. Since the cost is the infinite-time average, the optimal cost is given by (A.6). 
.
). Since the system (4.19) is mean-square stable, there exists a unique set of positive definite matrices P j,1 , j = 1, . . . , m, such that
Since the system (4.21) is mean-square stable, there also exists a unique set of positive definite matrices P j,2 , j = 1, . . . , m, such that
Then, P j is positive-definite. From (B.2) and (B.3) it follows that
we get that
is negative definite. By (B.4) and Remark 4.1, the system (4.12) is stable in the mean-square sense.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. From (4.14) and (B.1), it follows that
). Since the system (4.21) is mean-square stable, there exist positive matrices P j,3 and P j,4 such that the following equations hold:
From (B.5)-(B.7) it follows that
By the matrix's elementary transformation, we know
When the perturbation of the initial value ∆r(0) = 0, the corresponding solution is given by r(t) = e Let V (j,x) =x T P jx , j = 1, . . . , m,x ∈ R 2n , and A i denote the infinitesimal generator of {θ(t),x i (t)} in (C.1). Then, it follows from (B.4) that This together with the comparison theorem implies that EV (θ(t),x i (t)) ≤ EV (θ(0),x i (0))e Note that C s and C 1 are independent of i, N , and take
Then, by (C.2) and (C.3) we have (5.2).
To prove Theorem 5.3, we present an auxiliary lemma, which can be shown by a similar argument for proving Lemma C.1 in [18] , and hence the proof is omitted here. 
Hence,
